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1. The implementation of socio-economic programs through the procurement process is
not new. See 1 COMMISSION ON GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT, REPORT OF THE COMMIS-
SION ON GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT 111-24 (1972). That report identified thirty-nine
principal socio-economic programs then applicable to federal procurement. Id. at 114-15.
Current congressional activity evidences continued viability of such programs. See Kennedy,
Current Developments in Socioeconomic Issues in Government Contracting, 23 PUBLIC CON-
TRACT NEWSLETTER 3 (Spring 1988). Many of those programs find their counterparts in
state and local procurement, ranging from Buy-American provisions to prohibitions on con-
tracting with violators of environmental regulations. Some local governments have expanded
socio-economic intrusions into the procurement process, such as prohibitions on contracting
with companies investing in South Africa. See infra notes 191-216 and accompanying text.
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Ordinances establishing nuclear free zones are of recent origin and
are multiplying. As of June 1988, over 150 local jurisdictions in the
United States had adopted some type of nuclear free zone law.2 These
ordinances are often a creature of the initiative process or some other
form of direct democracy. 3 The generic term, "nuclear free zone," how-
ever, masks a welter of differences. Most nuclear free zone ordinances
are largely symbolic gestures without any discernible impact on the daily
activities of the citizenry or the governmental entity enacting the ordi-
nance. 4 Recently, however, a different type of ordinance has emerged.
These "second generation" or "new breed" nuclear free zone ordinances
have several provisions designed to have a practical impact.
Although the new breed ordinances differ among themselves in
some respects, the common feature, which this Article will examine, is
their prohibition on all contracts between the governmental body and a
vendor that produces components used in nuclear weapons. Main
County, California has adopted an ordinance typical of the new breed; it
prohibits the county from "mak[ing] any contract with, or investments
in, any nuclear weapons contractor."' 5 "Nuclear weapons contractor"
encompasses "any person, corporation, or other business entity, which
knowingly or intentionally is engaged in the research, development, pro-
duction, or testing of nuclear warheads, nuclear weapons systems, or nu-
clear weapons components."' 6 The ordinance defines "nuclear weapon"
to include the explosive component of any device, as well as triggering,
guidance, and propulsion components.7 Main County's blacklist of for-
bidden contractors includes Ford Motor Company, Motorola, IBM,
Westinghouse, General Electric, Sylvania, RCA, GTE, and General
Motors. 8
While not as common as their more conventional and symbolic
counterparts, new breed nuclear free zone ordinances continue to grow in
number and significance. As of October 1987, seven communities had
2. The New Abolitionist, June 1988, at 2, col. 1 (newsletter of Nuclear Free America, an
international clearinghouse and resource center advocating abolition of nuclear weapons) (on
file at The Hastings Law Journal).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. MARIN COUNTY, CAL., CODE ch. 23.12g § IV(C) (1988).
6. Id. ch. 23.12, § III(E). Main County enacted a supplemental ordinance extending
the reach of the ordinance to distributors and retailers of manufacturers of nuclear weapons
components. See id. ch. 23.13.
7. Id. ch. 23.12, § III(A).
8. See Minutes of the Main County Peace Conversion Commission Meeting (Jan. 25,
1988) (on file at The Hastings Law Journal).
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adopted new breed ordinances: 9 Arcata, California;1o Berkeley, Califor-
nia;" Hayward, California;12 Hoboken, New Jersey;13 Jersey City, New
Jersey; 14 Hood River County, Oregon;15 and Takoma Park, Maryland,1 6
whose ordinance, adopted on December 12, 1983, was the first of the new
breed.17 Additionally, Amherst, Massachusetts approved a new breed
ordinance in 1984, but the Massachusetts Attorney General voided the
law as unconstitutional in a brief letter ruling.18
Other communities, including Davis, California and Oakland, Cali-
fornia, are considering new breed ordinances. 19 With this increasing
presence, it becomes more likely that these ordinances will be subject to
judicial review.
9. See generally The New Abolitionist, June 1988, at 14 (compiling ordinances). Addi-
tionally, other jurisdictions have ordinances that might be termed "new breed," but do not
include the prohibition on contracts with nuclear weapons producers. See, e.g., CHICO, CAL.,
MUNICIPAL CODE, ch. 9.60 (1988); CHICAGO, ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE, ch. 202 (1986);
CHAPEL HILL, N.C., CODE OF ORDINANCES, art. XI, § 11 (1988); Eugene, Or., The Nuclear
Free Eugene Act (Nov. 4, 1986) (amended by Eugene, Or., Ordinance 19449 (Feb. 25, 1987)
and repealed by Eugene, Or., Ordinance 19565 (June 27, 1987)).
10. Arcata, Cal., Ordinance 1092 (Nov. 5, 1986) (known as the "Arcata Nuclear Weap-
ons Free Zone Ordinance") (on fie at The Hastings Law Journal). Arcata's ordinance seeks to
eliminate contracts with nuclear weapons producers "as much as possible under current state
and federal law." Id. § 5(B). As a practical matter, however, this savings clause has no effect.
As this Article demonstrates, the contractor's status as a nuclear weapons producer cannot
influence contracting decisions. Therefore, local governments cannot select against producers
of nuclear weapons components in any fashion and still act within the bounds of "current state
and federal law."
11. BERKELEY, CAL., ORDINANCES, ch. 12.90 (1986) (known as "The Nuclear Free
Berkeley Act").
12. Hayward, Cal., Ordinance 87-024 (Sept. 15, 1987) (known as "An Ordinance Estab-
lishing a Nuclear Free Hayward") (on file at The Hastings Law Journal).
13. Hoboken, N.J., Ordinance C-310 (Sept. 19, 1984) (known as "The Nuclear-Free Ho-
boken Ordinance") (on file at The Hastings Law Journal).
14. Jersey City, N.J., Ordinance C-30 (Sept. 12, 1985) (known as "An Ordinance Estab-
lishing Jersey City as a Nuclear-Free Zone") (on file at The Hastings Law Journal).
15. Hood River County, Or., Ordinance 159 (Nov. 17, 1986) (known as the "Nuclear
Free Hood River County Ordinance") (on ifie at The Hastings Law Journal).
16. TAKOMA PARK, MD., CODE §§ 8A-1 to -12 (1985) (on file at The Hastings Law
Journal).
17. The New Abolitionist, June 1988, at 14.
18. Amherst, Mass., Warrant of the Amherst Annual Town Meeting, art. 65 (Apr. 30,
1984), disapproved in Letter from The Massachusetts Dept. of the Attorney General to Am-
herst Town Clerk (Sept. 6, 1984) (copy on fie at The Hastings Law Journal).
19. The Davis ordinance was placed before the City Council upon approval by the Davis
Peace and Justice Commission. The Davis City Council has asked the Peace and Justice Com-
mission to do further work on the ordinance. See The Davis Enterprise, Apr. 21, 1988, at Al,
col. 5. Oakland's ordinance is set for election in November of 1988. (Copies of both draft
ordinances on file at The Hastings Law Journal).
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The new breed ordinances reflect strong disagreements with national
nuclear weapons policy. Many of the communities enacting new breed
ordinances have a tradition of progressive local politics, including open
disagreements with the federal government on matters of national and
international importance. 20 The political strategy underlying the ordi-
nances apparently is to begin on a small scale and work toward broader
results. This strategy is encapsulated neatly in the nuclear free zone
movement's now-familiar slogan, which implores citizens to "think glob-
ally, act locally." '21
The purpose of this Article is neither to resolve the debate between
these local jurisdictions and the federal government over the wisdom of
United States nuclear policy nor to critique the political strategy of the
nuclear free zone movement. Rather, the purpose of the Article is to
evaluate the legality of the ordinances' noncontracting provisions in light
of the important legal doctrines relating to competitive bidding and the
division of authority between the federal government and state and local
governments.
This Article examines three significant obstacles to the enforcement
of the noncontracting provisions of new breed ordinances.22 Part I eval-
uates the conflict between noncontracting provisions and state procure-
ment laws requiring local governments to award contracts to the lowest
responsible bidder. Focusing on California, the state with the most new
breed ordinances,23 part I concludes that the contracting prohibitions vi-
olate these state procurement statutes. Part II discusses the noncontract-
ing provisions in relation to the federal Atomic Energy Act of 195424 and
20. See, e.g., The Davis Enterprise, Apr. 21, 1988, at Al, col. 5 (discussing desire of
Davis City Council to effect the maximum possible change in United States nuclear policy).
21. Rand, Why Should We Invite a Military Ship to Santa Cruz?, The New Abolitionist,
Oct. 1987, at 5.
22. This is not to suggest that these obstacles are necessarily exhaustive of possible legal
challenges to the noncontracting provisions. In addition to the issues addressed in this Article,
lawyers have identified potential issues in several aspects of different ordinances, including
violations of state statutes, preemption under various federal statutes, and violations of the
commerce clause and the first amendment. See NUCLEAR FREE AMERICA, NUCLEAR FREE
ZONES AND THE LAW (undated) (pamphlet compiling opinion letters from individual govern-
ment attorneys, private attorneys, and others) (on file at The Hastings Law Journal); see also
Weaver, Clayton, Roche, Krause, Lloyd & Bamonte, The Legality of the Chicago Nuclear
Weapon Free Zone Ordinance, 17 Loy. U. CIii. L.J. 553, 554, 557-63, 571-77 (1986) (discuss-
ing the Chicago ordinance, which does not include a contracting prohibition) [hereinafter
Weaver].
23. The New Abolitionist, Oct. 1987, at 10, col. 1. Other states with such ordinances,
including Oregon and Massachusetts, impose similar requirements on local governments. See
infra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
24. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2296 (1982).
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concludes that the Act occupies the field regulating nuclear power and
weapons production and therefore preempts the provisions. Part III con-
siders whether the contracting prohibitions intrude on the federal mili-
tary and foreign relations powers; it concludes the ordinances do intrude
on these constitutionally granted powers of the federal government and
are therefore unconstitutional. Thus, the noncontracting provisions of
the second generation ordinances are legally invalid in at least three im-
portant respects.
I. Conflict with State Procurement Laws
Government procurement is most commonly conducted through
competitive bidding,25 which requires a governmental entity to contract
with "the lowest responsible bidder."'26 Although not all states impose a
"lowest responsible bidder" standard on contracting conducted by local
governments, 27 California imposes this requirement on local governmen-
tal entities by statute.28
The noncontracting provisions of the new breed ordinances forbid
local governments from contracting with producers of nuclear weapons
components. 29 When a producer of nuclear weapons components sub-
25. P. DAUER, A DESKBOOK OF PUBLIC CONTRACT LAW 90 (1977). The discussion of
the conflict between the nuclear contractor prohibitions and the competitive bidding method-
ology is applicable to other procurement methodologies that incorporate statutory restrictions
on the entity's mode of contracting or selecting its contractors. For instance, some jurisdic-
tions have specific statutes that accord preferences to small businesses, see, e.g., CAL. GOV'T
CODE §§ 14835, 14838(b) (West Supp. 1987); to in-state or local businesses, see, e.g., CAL.
PUB. UTIL. CODE §§ 14837(c), 14838(b) (West Supp. 1987); SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., ADMINIS-
TRATIVE CODE § 12D.8(B)(3); and to women-owned businesses, see, eg., CAL. PUB. UTIL.
CODE § 8281 (West Supp. 1988).
Ordinarily, however, the conflict inherent in a traditional competitive bidding context is
not present in negotiated procurements. In such methodologies, the procuring agency usually
has the discretion to specify the criteria for contractor selection. Thus, a criterion unrelated to
the contractor's ability to perform could be incorporated in the solicitation documents,
although in the instance of prohibitions on contracting with nuclear weapons producers such a
criterion would contravene constitutional principles. See infra notes 81-216 and accompany-
ing text.
26. See, e-g., CAL. PUB. CONT. CODE § 20128 (West 1985).
27. See, e.g., MD. STATE FIN. & PROC. CODE ANN. § 11-202(b)(4) (1985).
28. CAL. PUB. CONT. CODE. § 20128 (West 1985) (applying requirement to counties);
CAL. PUB. CONT. CODE § 20162 (West 1985) (applying requirement to cities); see, e.g.,
M.G.M. Constr. Co. v. County of Alameda, 615 F. Supp. 149, 150 (N.D. Cal. 1985) (citing
CAL. PUB. CONT. CODE § 20128 (West 1985)). Charters of local jurisdictions also impose
such a requirement. See, eg., SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., CHARTER § 7200 (1986); BERKELEY,
CAL., CHARTER, art. XI, § 65-67 (1977).
29. Some of the ordinances contain provisions for a waiver if no reasonable alternatives
exist. See, e.g., TAKOMA PARK, MD., CODE § 8A-6(f) (1985); Proposed Davis, Cal., Nuclear
Free Zone Ordinance § 16C-13(f) (on file at The Hastings Law Journal). If alternative con-
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mits the low bid, however, enforcement of the ordinance can violate the
statutory requirement that the local government award the contract to
the "lowest responsible bidder."' 30 The resolution of this conflict depends
upon the interpretation of the phrase "responsible bidder."
The California Supreme Court has had only one occasion to con-
strue this term. 31 In City of Inglewood-L.A. County Civic Center Author-
ity v. Superior Court,32 the court considered a disappointed bidder's
challenge to a civic authority's award of a construction contract. The
civic authority had conducted an extensive review of the bidders and
bids.33 The disappointed bidder had submitted the lowest monetary bid
and achieved minimum, or higher, scores on each of several tests
designed to evaluate the bidder's ability to perform the contract.34
The shunned bidder contended that the award violated the statutory
mandate that a civic authority contract with the lowest responsible bid-
der.35 The civic authority, pointing out that the chosen bidder had
scored significantly higher in the responsibility rating process, argued
that the award was proper because the second lowest bidder was "consid-
ered to be so superior as to justify its selection as the lowest responsible
bidder." 36 The court sided with the rejected bidder, explaining that "re-
sponsibility" in the public contract context refers "to the quality, fitness
and capacity of the low bidder to satisfactorily perform the proposed
work."' 37 The court concluded that the civic authority's judgment of
"relative superiority" was inappropriate 38 and that because the low bid-
der was responsible, awarding the contract to the other bidder violated
the statute.39
tractors are available, the ordinances with waiver provisions prevent nuclear weapons contrac-
tors from obtaining contracts. Thus, in those instances, the analysis developed in this section
is not altered.
30. CAL. PUB. CONT. CODE §§ 20128, 20162 (West 1985).
31. See City of Inglewood-L.A. Civic Center Auth. v. Superior Ct., 7 Cal. 3d 861, 500
P.2d 601, 103 Cal. Rptr. 689 (1972). California courts of appeal have interpreted the term,
however, invariably relying on City oflnglewood. See, e.g., Taylor Bus Serv., Inc. v. San Diego
Bd. of Educ., 195 Cal. App. 3d 1331, 1341 n.4, 241 Cal. Rptr. 379, 385 n.4 (1987); R & A
Vending Serv., Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 172 Cal. App. 3d 1188, 1193, 218 Cal. Rptr. 667,
669 (1985).
32. 7 Cal. 3d at 864, 500 P.2d at 603, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 690.
33. Id. at 868, 500 P.2d at 605, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 693.
34. Id. at 868-69, 500 P.2d at 605-06, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 693-94.
35. Id. at 867, 500 P.2d at 604, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 692 (citing CAL. GOV'T CODE § 25454
(current version at CAL. PUB. CONT. CODE § 20128 (West 1985))).
36. Id. at 869, 500 P.2d at 606, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 694.
37. Id. at 867, 500 P.2d at 604, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 692.
38. Id., 500 P.2d at 605, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 693.
39. Id. at 870, 500 P.2d at 606-07, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 694-95.
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The California Supreme Court thus interpreted responsibility as a
threshold concept. If the low monetary bidder bids to specifications and
meets the minimum criteria for responsibility, any award made must go
to it. Further, City of Inglewood held that the only relevant factor in
determining responsibility is the bidder's ability "to do the particular
work under consideration."''
This interpretation of responsibility presents a significant obstacle to
the contracting prohibition feature of the ordinances. The survival of
these provisions depends upon an expanded definition of the term "re-
sponsibility." Under the ordinances, a producer of a nuclear weapons
component may not receive a public contract in the governed jurisdic-
tion, regardless of its ability to perform the contract. In order for the
noncontracting provisions to pass muster, therefore, local governments
would need to have discretion to interpret responsibility to include the
local government's concept of social responsibility.41 By defining respon-
sibility in terms of performance ability, City of Inglewood impliedly re-
jected this interpretation.
Although no California state court case has squarely faced the issue
of interpreting "responsibility," several federal cases, applying California
law, have explored the question. In Associated General Contractors of
California v. San Francisco Unified School District,42 the plaintiff chal-
lenged a policy of the San Francisco Board of Education that allowed the
award of construction contracts only if the general contractor (a) was a
minority business enterprise, or (b) promised that one-fourth of the sub-
contractors it employed would be minority owned. Relying on City of
Inglewood, the Ninth Circuit held that the plan violated a California stat-
ute requiring school districts to contract with the lowest responsible bid-
der.43  The court reasoned that, because City of Inglewood's
interpretation of responsibility turned only on performance ability, the
Board's plan violated the statute by foreclosing the award of contracts to
40. Id. at 867, 500 P.2d at 604, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 692. Until recently, the California
Assembly was considering Assembly Bill 1160, 1987-88 Leg., Reg. Sess., which would alter
slightly the definition of responsibility in public works contracts. See Ferber, AB 1160: Who is
the "Lowest Responsible Bidder?, " PUBLIC LAW NEWS 2 (Winter 1987). That bill provided
that responsibility is "'the quality, fitness, capacity, integrity, and other attributes of responsi-
bility to perform the particular requirements of the public works contract."' Id. at 9 (quoting
Assembly Bill 1160). Although the precise intended effect of the bill was unclear, it expressly
maintained the link between responsibility and capacity to perform recognized in City of In-
glewood. Id The "Lowest Responsible Bidder" provision of Assembly Bill 1160 has died, but
its substance has been resurrected in Assembly Bill 3045, 1987-88 Leg., Reg. Sess..
41. See supra notes 25, 35-39 and accompanying text.
42. 616 F.2d 1381, 1384 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 449 U.S. 1061 (1980).
43. Id. at 1385.
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bidders able to perform. 44 The court noted that it would not "deny that
under California law a school district could require a bidder to agree not
to violate anti-discrimination laws."' 45 The Ninth Circuit panel con-
cluded, however, that the failure of a bidder to accede to the entity's
views on a "controversial social question" was not a proper basis on
which to exclude a bidder. Consequently, the court struck down the
requirement. 46
The Ninth Circuit adhered to this reasoning in Associated General
Contractors of California, Inc. v. City and County of San Francisco.4 7 In
City of San Francisco, the city passed an ordinance giving five percent
bidding preferences to locally owned, minority-owned, and women-
owned business enterprises.48 The San Francisco city charter, however,
required that contracts over $50,000 be awarded to "the lowest reliable
and responsible bidder."'49
As it had done in San Francisco Unified School District, the Ninth
Circuit relied upon City of Inglewood to find that responsibility depended
only upon ability to perform the contract. 50 The San Francisco plan,
however, would have awarded contracts to a bidder other than the lowest
bidder able to perform in cases in which the low bidder did not qualify
for a preference and did not bid more than five percent lower than all
preferred contractors.5 The court therefore concluded that the plan
44. Id.
45. Id. at 1385 n.4. In M.G.M. Constr. Co. v. Alameda County, 615 F. Supp. 149, 150-
51 (N.D. Cal. 1985), the district court struck down a similar plan imposed by a county. The
M.G.M. court relied on City of Inglewood, which also interpreted CAL GOV'T CODE § 25454
(West 1968) (current version at CAL. PUB. CONT. CODE § 20128 (West 1985)). M.G.M., 615
F. Supp. at 150-51; see City of Inglewood, 7 Cal. 3d 861, 867, 500 P.2d 601, 604, 103 Cal. Rptr.
689, 692 (1972). Thus M.G.M. is consistent with San Francisco Unified in treating "lowest
responsible bidder" as meaning the same thing in different statutes. The M.G.M. court con-
founds the issue, however, by noting without discussion, but in contradistinction to City of
Inglewood and City of San Francisco, that "to the extent the County's affirmative action pro-
gram purports to authorize the rejection of low bids on the basis of the bidder's failure to
comply with the ten percent goal for minority subcontractor participation, the program is
illegal under California Public Contract Code section 20128." M.G.M., 615 F. Supp. at 151.
This statement is consistent only with a tacit recognition that even if treated as an element of
bid responsiveness, in contrast to bidder responsibility, the affirmative action requirement is in
fatal conflict with the statutory standard of award. See infra notes 59-74 and accompanying
text for a discussion of bidder responsibility and bid responsiveness in this context.
46. 616 F.2d at 1385 n.4 (citing 57 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 574 (1974))
47. 813 F.2d 922 (9th Cir. 1987).
48. Id. at 924.
49. Id. at 925 (quoting SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., CHARTER § 7.200 (1986)).
50. Id.
51. Id.
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violated the charter by considering criteria other than the bidder's ability
to do the work under consideration.5 2
As the City of San Francisco court noted, authorities from states
other than California are not unanimous on the issue. In Southwest
Washington National Electrical Contractors Association v. Pierce
County, 53 the Washington Supreme Court considered a county require-
ment that a contractor employ twelve percent or more women- or minor-
ity-owned businesses as subcontractors, or show that compliance with
this requirement was impracticable. The Washington court interpreted
responsibility to include a component of social responsibility.54 Reason-
ing that a contractor that does not meet affirmative action goals is so-
cially irresponsible, the court upheld the plan.55
Absent legislative action, a California state court could not approve
the contracting prohititions in new breed ordinances without repudiating
San Francisco Unified School District and City of San Francisco.56 Both
cases reject the expansive view of responsibility necessary to uphold the
validity of the provisions. While federal court interpretations of state law
do not bind state courts,57 at least three factors make it unlikely that a
California court, or a court following California's generally restrictive
view of responsibility, would approve the contracting prohibitions in the
face of a lowest responsible bidder requirement.
52. Id. at 926 n.7, 927. The court also concluded that portions of the plan were unconsti-
tutional under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 928-44. See
generally Days, Fulliove, 96 YALE L.J. 453 (1987) (discussing the constitutional implications
of affirmative action plans in government contracts); Affirmative Action in Local Public Pro-
curement, 44 FEDERAL CONTRACTS REPORTS 1108 (1985) (presenting a framework for ana-
lyzing government contract affirmative action plans in relation to competitive bidding laws and
the equal protection clause).
53. 100 Wash. 2d 109, 115, 667 P.2d 1092, 1094 (1983).
54. Id., 667 P.2d at 1095-96.
55. Id. In a case relied upon by Southwest Washington, the Illinois Supreme Court ap-
proved a nearly identical plan with similar reasoning. See S.N. Nielson Co. v. Public Bldg.
Comm'n, 81 Ill. 2d 290, 299, 410 N.E.2d 40, 44 (1980).
56. California Public Contract Code § 2000, enacted in response to M.G.M. Constr. Co.
v. Alameda County, 615 F. Supp. 149 (N.D. Cal. 1985), authorizes local agencies to consider
compliance with affirmative action requirements in awarding public contracts, notwithstand-
ing any provision of law requiring an award to the lowest responsible bidder. Such a legislative
response, however, merely emphasizes that responsibility is a concept that requires legislative
action to alter. See generally Harris, "Good Faith Efforts" as an Element of Bidder Responsi-
bility--California's Legislative Response, in PUBLIC WORKS CONTRACTS, LOCAL, STATE,
FEDERAL PROTESTS... AND FINANCING ... AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION (American Bar
Association 1988) (discussing legislature's addition to list of elements of bidder responsibility
"good faith efforts" by bidder to meet minority- or women-owned business participation goals
of local agencies).
57. See C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 370-77 (4th ed.
1983).
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First, the federal courts' interpretation of City of Inglewood remains
compelling, and the concept of responsibility espoused by the City of In-
glewood court is fundamentally at odds with the more amorphous con-
cept needed to validate the new breed ordinances.5 8 City of Inglewood
viewed the responsibility requirement simply as a screening device to
eliminate bidders unable to perform. An interpretation of responsibility
that allows public contract statutes to promote particular views of social
policy goes well beyond the implicit, if not explicit, limits of City of
Inglewood.
Second, even decisions such as Southwest Washington do not go far
enough to validate the noncontracting provisions of the new breed ordi-
nances. The plan approved in Southwest Washington did not require the
bidder to possess any particular quality, only that it promise in the bid to
meet affirmative action goals in hiring subcontractors. 59 Although the
Southwest Washington court treated the question of whether such a plan
complied with state law as an issue of bidder responsibility, 6° that case
also involved elements of bid responsiveness. Responsibility focuses on
the qualities of the bidder. 61 Responsiveness, on the other hand, focuses
on the qualities of the bid.62 A bid is responsive only if it conforms sub-
stantially to the specifications set by the contracting entity; the bidder
itself is not a factor.63
The issue in Southwest Washington, therefore, might be recast as a
question of bid responsiveness. The requirement of hiring minority sub-
58. As the City of San Francisco court observed, the City of Inglewood definition of re-
sponsibility is
a concept capable of relatively precise definition and objective application. Notions
of social responsibility, commendable as they may be, are of a wholly different char-
acter. One person's social responsibility is another's officious intermeddling. The
district court's approach removes an objective standard from the charter and substi-
tutes for it a concept so nebulous that it removes any meaningful constraint on the
Board's actions.
Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. City and County of San Francisco, 813 F.2d 922,
926 n.7 (9th Cir. 1987). Echoing this theme, the court noted that "fairness means different
things to different people, many of them inconsistent with the requirement that contracts be
awarded to the 'lowest reliable and responsible bidder.'" Id. at 926 n.8.
59. Southwest Wash. Nat'l Elec. Contractors Ass'n v. Pierce County, 100 Wash. 2d 109,
111-12, 667 P.2d 1092, 1094 (1983); see supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
60. 100 Wash. 2d at 114-17, 667 P.2d at 1095-96; see supra notes 53-55 and accompany-
ing text.
61. See supra notes 37-52 and accompanying text.
62. See, e.g., National Coach Corp. v. State Bd. of Control, 137 Cal. App. 3d 750, 753-57,
187 Cal. Rptr. 261, 262-65 (1982); see also P. SHNITZER, GOVERNMENT CONTRACT BIDDING
13-1 to -24 (3d ed. 1987).
63. See, e.g., Taylor Bus Serv. Inc. v. San Diego Bd. of Educ., 195 Cal. App. 3d 1331,
1341-43, 241 Cal. Rptr. 379, 385-86 (1987); 47 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 129 (1966).
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contractors could be understood as analogous to a requirement that a
bidder use certain construction materials or otherwise conform to specifi-
cations, which is undeniably a matter of bid responsiveness." 4 So under-
stood, the holding in Southwest Washington would not depend upon an
expanded definition of responsibility; rather, it could be explained on the
less controversial grounds that local governments may require contrac-
tors to submit bids that are responsive to affirmative action goals.65
Two federal cases interpreting California law, Associated General
Contractors of California v. San Francisco Unified School District 66 and
M.G.M. Construction Co. v. County of Alameda, 67 considered plans that,
like the plan in Southwest Washington, required contractors to meet af-
firmative action goals in hiring subcontractors. 68 Like Southwest Wash-
ington, these cases treated the issue as one of bidder responsibility; unlike
Southwest Washington, these cases concluded that such plans are incon-
sistent with the concept of responsibility. 69 Thus, these federal cases im-
plicitly reject the inference, which might be drawn from Southwest
Washington, that the concept of bid responsiveness can be a vehicle to
promote social goals.
Even if bid responsiveness can accommodate social goals under
some circumstances, however, new breed ordinances still could not sur-
vive a state law challenge. Unlike the affirmative action plans at issue in
Southwest Washington, San Francisco Unified School District, and
M. G.M., the noncontracting provisions of the new breed ordinances can-
not be recast as a matter of bid responsiveness. The ordinances' selection
scheme focuses entirely on a quality of the bidder. A producer of nuclear
weapons components cannot overcome the prohibition on selection
through any method of bid performance, such as hiring certain classes of
subcontractors. A nuclear weapons producer cannot contract regardless
of how the bidder promises to perform. Further, M.G.M. and San Fran-
cisco Unified School District, by focusing exclusively on responsibility,
64. See, e.g., National Coach Corp., 137 Cal. App. 3d at 753-57, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 262-65.
At least one district court has recognized that requirements that general contractors employ
minority-owned subcontractors reasonably can be construed as a matter of bid responsiveness.
See Gilbert Cent. Corp. v. Kemp, 637 F. Supp. 843, 848-49 (D. Kan. 1986).
65. The Illinois Supreme Court, in S.N. Nielson Co. v. Public Bldg. Comm'n, 81 111. 2d
290, 296-301, 410 N.E. 2d 40, 43-45 (1980), also treated a requirement that a general contrac-
tor meet affirmative action goals as an issue of responsibility.
66. 616 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1980).
67. 615 F. Supp. 149 (N.D. Cal. 1985).
68. See Southwest Wash. Nat'l Elec. Contractors Ass'n v. Pierce County, 100 Wash. 2d
109, 115, 667 P.2d 1092, 1096 (1983).
69. San Francisco Unified, 616 F.2d at 1385; M.G.M., 615 F. Supp. at 150.
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reject any implication that recasting the issue as one of responsiveness
can circumvent the responsibility requirement.
In City of San Francisco, the Ninth Circuit implicitly recognized this
distinction between responsibility and responsiveness. 70 The court noted
that validating an ordinance like the one at issue in City of San Fran-
cisco 71 would expand the concept of responsibility. 72 Both the ordinance
in City of San Francisco and new breed ordinances depend entirely on the
bidder, not the bid. As the City of San Francisco court noted, Southwest
Washington did not go so far as to hold that an ordinance focusing exclu-
sively on a quality of the bidder was permissible,73 and the only reported
decision approving such an ordinance was the opinion of the district
court below in City of San Francisco.74 Validation of the noncontracting
provisions of new breed ordinances would require a court to embrace the
repudiated view of the district court in City of San Francisco and thus to
go beyond the bounds of any reported decision retaining its persuasive
force.
Third, even assuming that a responsibility determination could per-
mit preferences to bidders based on racial and gender criteria, it does not
necessarily follow that the criteria imposed by the new breed ordinances
are appropriate. Congress has implemented affirmative action goals
through federal procurement legislation. 75 Affirmative action prefer-
ences at the local level are fully consonant with this established national
policy. 76 No analogous statement of national policy opposing nuclear
weapons exists; on the contrary, the federal government is the primary
source of funding for nuclear facilities, including those developing weap-
ons. A definition of responsibility encompassing a policy of opposition to
nuclear weapons therefore would lack the foundation in national policy
enjoyed by affirmative action plans. Thus, allowing a local government
to impose its vision of nuclear responsibility on prospective contractors
70. City of San Francisco, 813 F.2d at 926 (responsibility is bidder's willingness and abil-
ity to comply with standards; bidder's responsiveness must be considered as part of his
responsibility).
71. See supra notes 47-52 and accompanying text.
72. City of San Francisco, 813 F.2d at 926.
73. Id. at 926-27 (citing Southwest Washington, 100 Wash. 2d at 112, 667 P.2d at 1094).
74. See Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. City and County of San Francisco,
619 F. Supp. 334, 344 (N.D. Cal. 1985), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 813 F.2d 922 (9th Cir.
1987).
75. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 492 (1980) (federal statute requiring ten
percent of federally funded public works contracts be awarded to minority owned businesses is
constitutional); Office of Management and Budget, Circular A-102, at Attachment 0 (mandat-
ing the inclusion of affirmative action in the minimum acceptable procurement standards ap-
plicable to state and local government expenditures of federal grant funds).
76. See infra notes 81-166 and accompanying text.
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would stretch the concept of responsibility much further than would an
affirmative action plan like the one struck down in City of San Francisco.
Similar statutes in other states with new breed ordinances present
the same obstacle. Like California, Oregon requires that local govern-
ments contract with the lowest responsible bidder.77 The Oregon stat-
utes foreclose a broad reading of responsibility: a bidder is irresponsible
only if it lacks the financial ability, equipment, or key personnel to per-
form the contract, or has "repeatedly breached contractual obligations to
public and private contracting agencies."78 Massachusetts also imposes a
lowest responsible bidder requirement on local governments. 79
Thus, state procurement laws mandating the award of local govern-
ment contracts to the lowest responsible bidder are serious obstacles to
the vitality of the noncontracting provisions. Ultimately, however, this
may prove to be the least compelling objection to the ordinances. State
statutes may be amended with sufficient support in state legislatures.
California, for instance, has amended its statutes governing some public
contracts to allow for specified types of preferences.80 New breed ordi-
nances conceivably could achieve sufficient political popularity to con-
vince state legislatures to remove all state law roadblocks to their
enforcement. Political resolution of the legal objections raised in the fol-
lowing sections, however, would require congressional action and a con-
stitutional amendment.
77. OR. REV. STAT. § 279.055 (1987) (local governments must review contracts in same
fashion as the state); id. § 279.029 (public contracting agencies must award to the "lowest
responsible bidder").
78. Id. § 279.037; see also Hanson v. Mosser, 247 Or. 1, 9, 427 P.2d 97, 100-01 (1967)
(interpreting previous statutory scheme).
79. Mass. Gen. Law Ann., ch. 149, § 44A (West 1982 & Supp. 1988) (public contracts
must be awarded to lowest responsible bidder); id. ch. 40, § 5B (West 1985 & Supp. 1985); id.
ch. 44, §§ 54-55A (West 1968 & Supp. 1988) (investment of trust funds; public funds on de-
posit) (regulating municipal contracts); id. ch. 164, § 57 (West 1976 & Supp. 1988) (regulating
municipal contracts); see also Letter from Massachusetts Dept. of The Attorney General to
Amherst Town Clerk at 3-4 n.1 (Sept. 6, 1984) (on file at The Hastings Law Journal) (conclud-
ing that Amherst's nuclear free zone ordinance may conflict with lowest responsible bidder
statutes). Massachusetts case law makes clear, however, that the responsibility requirement is
not implied absent a statute. See, eg., Datrol, Inc. v. State Purchasing Agent, 379 Mass. 679,
698 n.15, 400 N.E.2d 1218, 1229 n.15 (1980); Archambault v. Mayor of Lowell, 278 Mass.
327, 332, 180 N.E. 157, 159 (1932); Larkin v. County Comm'rs of Middlesex, 274 Mass. 437,
439, 174 N.E. 684, 689 (1931). In contrast Maryland, home of the Takoma Park ordinance,
apparently does not impose a lowest responsible bidder requirement on local governments.
MD. STATE FIN. & PROC. CODE ANN. § 11-202(b)(3) (1985) (exempting Maryland local gov-
ernments from the statutory provisions requiring the award of contracts to lowest responsible
bidders).
80. See, eg., CAL. PUB. CONT. CODE § 20229 (West 1985) (gives preferences by setting
percentage goals for nonfederally funded contracts that correspond with such goals in federally
funded contracts); id. § 2000 (permits preferences for women or minority-owned businesses).
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IL Preemption Under the Atomic Energy Act
A. Preemption of Nuclear Power Regulation Generally
The United States Supreme Court has examined the preemptive ef-
fect of the federal Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (AEA)81 on local and state
laws three times in the last two decades. 82 The AEA, like all other fed-
eral laws, draws its preemptive force from the Constitution's supremacy
clause, which provides that federal laws "shall be the Supreme Law of
the land."'8 3- This elementary principle, however, spawns a multitude of
complexities in application to a particular federal statutory scheme,8 4
and the AEA is no exception.
For more than a decade, Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota 8 5
stood as the leading case on the preemptive effect of the AEA. In North-
ern States, the Eighth Circuit held that the AEA preempted a Minnesota
law regulating radioactive emissions of nuclear power plants more
strictly than federal laws. The court noted that the AEA is a complex
and pervasive scheme, empowering the Atomic Energy Commission
(now the Nuclear Regulatory Commission) to license nuclear power
plants for operation only upon a determination that the plants will meet
81. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2296 (1982).
82. See Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238 (1984); Pacific Gas and Elec. Co. v.
State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190 (1983); Northern States
Power Co. v. Minnesota, 447 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1971), affd memL, 405 U.S. 1035 (1972).
The preemptive effect of federal law is identical on both state laws and laws of governmen-
tal agencies that draw their authority from states, such as cities and counties. See, e.g., Jersey
Cent. Power & Light Co. v. Township of Lacey, 772 F.2d 1103, 1110-12 (3d Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 475 U.S. 1013 (1986) (applying cases preempting state laws to a local ordinance); Citi-
zens for Orderly Energy Policy, Inc. v. County of Suffolk, 604 F. Supp. 1084, 1093-96
(E.D.N.Y. 1985) (same); United States v. City of N.Y., 463 F. Supp. 604, 607-08 (S.D.N.Y.
1978) (same).
83. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
84. See, e.g., Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 107 S. Ct. 1549 (1987) (preemption under
Employees' Retirement Income and Security Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461(1982 & Supp.
1986)); Allis-Chalmers v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202 (1985) (preemption under section 301 of the
Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1982 & Supp. 1986)). See
generally Rothschild, A Proposed "Tonic" with Florida Lime to Celebrate our New Federalism:
How to Deal with the "Headache" of Preemption, 38 U. MIAMI L. REV. 829 (1984) (discussing
and criticizing various facets of the preemption doctrine).
85. 447 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1971), aff'd mem., 405 U.S. 1035 (1972). Summary affir-
mances of lower court opinions are "not to be read as an adoption of the reasoning supporting
the judgment under review." Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 64 n.13 (1982). Nonetheless, a
summary affirmance does affirm the judgment and thus is more significant than an action that
simply does not disturb the judgment of the lower court, such as denial of review. Therefore,
lower courts have treated Northern States as a leading case, with at least one placing heavy
reliance on the Supreme Court's summary affirmance. See Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Pol-
lution Control Bd., 5 Ill. App. 3d 800, 801, 284 N.E.2d 342, 342-43 (1972).
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specified safety standards.8 6 In arguing against preemption of its emis-
sion control law, Minnesota placed primary reliance on section 274(k) of
the AEA, 87 which provides in pertinent part that "[n]othing in this sec-
tion shall be construed to affect the authority of any State or local agency
to regulate activities for purposes other than protection against radiation
hazards.188 Minnesota contended that this section evidenced a congres-
sional intent to allow concurrent state and federal nuclear safety
regulation. 89
The Eighth Circuit disagreed. It noted that even though the AEA
did not contain an express provision preempting state laws, the Act was
sufficiently comprehensive with respect to matters of nuclear safety to
require an inference of preemptive intent.90 The court agreed that the
1959 amendments to the AEA, which added the provision relied upon by
Minnesota, allowed for an expanded role of the states in matters related
to nuclear power.91 Pointing to the federal government's reservation of
matters relating to "radiation hazards" in section 274(k), however, the
court concluded that the federal government exercised plenary control
over matters related to nuclear safety. 92 Upon reviewing the legislative
history of section 274(k), the court concluded that, although the 1954
version of the AEA and its 1959 amendments had ceded some authority
to the states, the amendments were not meant to allow concurrent juris-
diction over radiation hazards. 93 Because Minnesota's law controlling
radioactive emissions directly related to nuclear and radioactive safety,
the court held that the law was preempted.94
Other courts, both before and after Northern States, generally ad-
hered to the distinction between radioactive and nonradioactive safety
matters suggested by Northern States.95 In Pacific Gas and Electric Co. v.
86. Northern States, 447 F.2d at 1148-49 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2021(k) (1982)).
87. Id. at 1149.
88. 42 U.S.C. § 2021(k) (1982).
89. Northern States, 447 F.2d at 1149.
90. Id at 1148.
91. Id.
92. Id at 1150.
93. Id. at 1150-52. As the dissent pointed out, the legislative history is not unequivocal
on this point. Id at 1155; see also Note, Jurisdiction-Atomic Energy, 68 MICH. L. REV. 1294,
1301-06 (1970). Nonetheless, the committee reports referred to by the majority are clear on
the point and are generally held to be more persuasive than statements of individuals, such as
those upon which the dissent relied. See, eg., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 385
(1968).
94. Northern States, 447 F.2d at 1154.
95. See, eg., Commonwealth of Pa. v. General Pub. Util. Corp., 710 F.2d 117, 120 (3d
Cir. 1983) (action for private nuisance caused by radioactive hazards preempted by AEA);
Washington State Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Spellman, 684 F.2d 627, 630-32 (9th Cir.
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State Energy Resources Conservation & Development Commission,96 the
Supreme Court directly addressed the principles developed in Northern
States and its progeny. At issue in Pacific Gas was the validity of Califor-
nia's Warren-Alquist State Energy Resources Conservation and Devel-
opment Act. 97 The relevant portion of this law imposed a moratorium
on nuclear power plant construction until a state commission found that
" 'there exists a demonstrated technology or means for the disposal of
high level-nuclear waste.' "98
The Pacific Gas Court began by analyzing the parameters of the pre-
emption doctrine. First, the Court noted, Congress may preempt state
law in express terms. 99 Second, absent express preemption, implied pre-
emption occurs if Congress has regulated pervasively, particularly in ar-
eas of strong federal interest, and thus displaced state law from the entire
1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 913 (1983) (law closing Washington borders to nuclear waste
preempted by AEA); Illinois v. Kerr-McGee Chem. Corp., 677 F.2d 571, 579-81 (7th Cir.
1982) (action for public nuisance to abate radioactive hazards preempted by AEA); Simmons
v. Arkansas Power & Light Co., 655 F.2d 131, 134-35 (8th Cir. 1981) (private litigant cannot
force closing of nuclear power plant pending development of emergency plans for reactor acci-
dents); Liesen v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 636 F.2d 94, 95 (5th Cir. 1981) (private litigant
cannot enjoin construction of nuclear power plant by claiming violations of AEA standards);
Susquehanna Valley Alliance v. Three Mile Island Nuclear Reactor, 619 F.2d 231, 237-39 (3d
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1096 (1981) (private litigants cannot enjoin reactor operation
based on allegations of plans to release radioactive materials into river); United Nuclear Corp.
v. Cannon, 553 F. Supp. 1220, 1229-32 (D.R.I. 1982) (state statute requiring posting of bond
for twenty years to cover clean-up costs for any radiation hazard preempted by AEA); North-
ern Cal. Ass'n to Preserve Bodega Head and Harbor, Inc. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 61 Cal. 2d
126, 133, 390 P.2d 200, 204, 37 Cal. Rptr. 432, 436 (1964) (California Public Utilities Commis-
sion may consider earthquake safety implications of reactor siting); Commonwealth Edison
Co. v. Pollution Control Bd., 5 Ill. App. 3d 800, 801, 284 N.E.2d 342, 342-43 (1972) (state
statute imposing safety conditions on reactors preempted by AEA); Marshall v. Consumers
Power Co., 65 Mich. App. 237, 247, 237 N.W.2d 266, 274-75 (1975) (action for nuisance based
on radioactive hazard preempted, but action based on steam, fogging, and icing not pre-
empted); State ex rel Utility Consumers Council v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 562 S.W.2d 688,
698-99 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978). See generally Annotation, State Regulation of Nuclear Power
Plants, 82 A.L.R. 3d 751 (1978 & Supp. 1987) (discussing courts' attempts to distinguish "ra-
diological" from "nonradiological" matters.).
96. 461 U.S. 190 (1983).
97. CAL. PuB. RES. CODE §§ 25000-25986 (West Supp. 1987).
98. Pacific Gas, 461 U.S. at 198 (quoting CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 25524.2(a), (c) (West
1977)). Also appealed was the district court's holding that the AEA preempts Public Re-
source Code section 25524.1(b), which imposes a moratorium on plant construction until the
state commission determines that there exists adequate interim storage for spent fuel rods.
Both the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court concluded that the issue was not ripe for
review and declined to reach a holding on the merits. Pacific Gas, 461 U.S. at 199, 203; Pacific
Legal Found. v. State Energy Resources, 659 F.2d 903, 916 (9th Cir. 1981).
99. Pacific Gas, 461 U.S. at 203 (citing Jones v. Roth Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525
(1977)).
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field.lc ° Third, federal law preempts when it "actually conflicts" with
state law.101 That is, state law is preempted when compliance with both
state and federal standards "is a physical impossibility,"'10 2 or when state
law is "an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full pur-
poses and objectives of Congress."10 3
Because the AEA does not contain any express statement of pre-
emption, the Court began with the second branch of the doctrine: im-
plied preemption through pervasive regulation. 1°4 The Court initially
noted that although the AEA is broad in its regulation of nuclear power
plants, it is not all-encompassing, and substantial room exists for state
regulation of nuclear power. 105 The Court pointed to two provisions rel-
egating some authority to the states. First, section 271 of the AEA pro-
vides that "[n]othing in this chapter shall be construed to affect the
authority ... of any Federal, State or local agency with respect to the
generation, sale or transmission of electrical power produced through the
use of nuclear facilities. .. ."106 The Court observed that the statutory
language and history of this section confirmed that while "the safety of
nuclear technology was the exclusive business of the federal government,
state power over the production of electricity was not otherwise
displaced."10 7
The second provision conferring authority upon the states was sec-
tion 274(k) of the AEA, upon which the Northern States court relied
heavily. The Court found it necessary to examine the history of the 1959
AEA amendments that added section 274(k).108 The Court concluded
that section 274(k) was not an affirmative grant of power to the states;
rather, Congress added section 274(k) to make clear that the 1959
amendments had not drawn any more authority from the states than the
100. Id. at 204 (citing Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. De la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153
(1982)).
101. Id.
102. Id. (quoting Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43
(1963)).
103. Id. (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)). This synopsis of preemp-
tion doctrine is similar to summaries offered by other courts and commentators. See, e.g.,
Illinois v. Kerr-McGee Chem. Corp., 677 F.2d 571, 579 (7th Cir. 1982); Northern States, 447
F.2d at 1146; Rothschild, supra note 84, at 848-54. See generally Note, Federal Preemption:
Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 60 TuL. L. REv. 407 (1985) (authored by John William Hite,
III) (discussing preemptive effect of Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-
1376 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)).
104. Pacific Gas, 461 U.S. at 205.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 208.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 210.
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original act passed in 1946, as amended in 1954.109 In so doing, Con-
gress "underscored the distinction drawn in 1954" between regulation of
nuclear power plants for safety reasons, and elemental decisions of state
governments as to whether nuclear power plants are desirable from other
perspectives. 110
Based upon this interpretation of the AEA, the Court decided that
the Act did not preempt the California statute because its conditional
moratorium on construction was based on economic, not safety, con-
cerns.11 1 The Court noted that much of the official analysis of the bill
cited economic goals and avowed an economic purpose for the legisla-
tion. 112 While acknowledging that some legislators may have voted for
the bill for safety reasons, the Court reasoned that official statements are
a more satisfactory guide to determining legislative intent than psychoa-
nalysis of each legislator.1 13 The Court thus held that the California stat-
ute did not fall within the occupied zone of nuclear safety regulation and
that it was not preempted under the implied preemption doctrine." 14
The Pacific Gas Court also considered whether the California statute
actually conflicted with the AEA by frustrating the purpose of the Act,
thus necessitating a holding of preemption under the third branch of the
preemption doctrine."15 The Court noted that while a basic purpose of
the AEA is to promote nuclear power,' 1 6 the objective of promoting nu-
clear power is to be achieved economically. 1 7 Concluding that the Cali-
fornia statute, construed as a guarantor of economically viable nuclear
development, was not at cross-purposes with the AEA, the Court ruled
that the California Warren-Alquist Act was outside the range of the
AEA's preemptive force." 8
The final link in the chain of AEA preemption cases was Silkwood
v. Kerr-McGee Corp. 119 In Silkwood, the administrator of Karen Silk-
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 214-17.
112. Id. at 214.
113. Id. at 216; see also R. DWORKIN, A MATrER OF PRINCIPLE ch. 5 (1986) (arguing
that absent evidence of a common psychological motivation among a majority of legislators
voting for a bill, the only guide to legislative intent is committee reports and other "official"
statements of legislative purpose).
114. Pacific Gas, 461 U.S. at 216.
115. Id. at 220. The Court also considered, and rejected, the argument that various Nu-
clear Regulatory Commission regulations of waste disposal preempted the statute. Id. at 217-
20.
116. Id. at 217-21.
117. Id. at 222.
118. Id.
119. 464 U.S. 238 (1984).
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wood's estate brought a diversity action against Kerr-McGee, seeking
relief under various Oklahoma common-law theories.120 Silkwood was
employed as a laboratory analyst at Kerr-McGee's nuclear fuel pins
fabrication plant,1 21 which was subject to safety regulation under the
AEA.122 Silkwood's administrator claimed that Kerr-McGee tortiously
contaminated Silkwood with plutonium. The jury agreed and returned a
verdict of $5,000 in compensatory damages for injury to Silkwood's
property, $500,000 in compensatory damages for personal injuries, and
$10 million in punitive damages. 123 The Tenth Circuit reversed the
award of compensatory damages for personal injury, holding that it was
barred by the exclusive remedy of Oklahoma's workers' compensation
statute; it also reversed the award of punitive damages, holding that the
AEA preempted the award.1 24
On review, the Supreme Court evaluated only the propriety of the
punitive damages award. The Court began by considering whether the
punitive damages award fell within the AEA-occupied field of nuclear
safety, and was therefore preempted. The Court noted that the award of
punitive damages was a punishment for failing to conform to state-man-
dated standards of nuclear safety.125 Under the standards announced in
Pacific Gas, therefore, the AEA ordinarily would preempt the punitive
damages award. 126
The Court decided, however, that specific features of the AEA re-
quired the opposite result. The majority observed that Congress had
passed the Price-Anderson Act 127 to limit liability for state law claims
against certain licensees of nuclear technology under the AEA for inju-
ries relating to "nuclear incidents."1 28 The Court reasoned that this limi-
tation would be unnecessary if the AEA displaced usually available state
tort law remedies. 1 29 Upon review of the legislative history, the majority
noted that Congress drafted the Price-Anderson Act under the assump-
tion that plaintiffs would have access to the traditional range of tort rem-
edies for contamination arising out of a nuclear incident.1 30 The Court
120. Id. at 243.
121. I d at 241.
122. Ird
123. Id. at 245.
124. Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Silkwood, 667 F.2d 908, 923 (10th Cir. 1981), rev'd in part,
464 U.S. 238 (1984).
125. 464 U.S. at 250-51.
126. Id.
127. Id at 251.
128. Id (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (1982)).
129. Id at 252.
130. Id at 252-54.
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thus concluded that the AEA did not displace tort law remedies tradi-
tionally available to private parties to redress personal and property
injuries. 131
In finding that Silkwood could recover damages for a nuclear inci-
dent, the majority rejected Kerr-McGee's argument, endorsed by both
dissents, that punitive damages were inconsistent with the AEA. 32 The
Court noted that "[p]unitive damages have long been part of traditional
state tort law." 133 The Silkwood majority remained convinced that puni-
tive damages were appropriate because the AEA did not displace state
tort law; state remedies therefore applied "with full force." 134
The Silkwood Court also considered the appropriateness of punitive
damages under the "actual conflict" branch of preemption analysis. The
majority observed that there is no "physical impossibility" of paying pu-
nitive damage awards and complying with the AEA.135 After briefly re-
stating Pacific Gas' analysis, the Court concluded that punitive damages
awards do not frustrate any of the purposes of the AEA because the Act
does not require promotion of nuclear energy "'at all costs.' 1136 The
Court thus reversed the Tenth Circuit's holding and reinstated
Silkwood's punitive damages award.
Although lower courts have endeavored to find a precise doctrine
for preemption under the AEA, 137 none has emerged.1 38 For instance,
under Pacific Gas, a moratorium motivated by safety concerns appar-
ently is preempted; however, a moratorium couched in economic terms,
but identical in effect, is not. 139 Under Silkwood and Northern States, a
131. Id. at 256.
132. Id. at 255; id. at 260-66 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at 272 (Powell, J., dissenting).
133. Id. at 255.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 257.
136. Id. (quoting Pacific Gas, 461 U.S. at 222).
137. See, e.g., Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. Township of Lacey, 772 F.2d 1103, 1110-
13 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1013 (1986) (local ordinance forbidding transportation
of nuclear waste within township preempted by the AEA); County of Suffolk v. Long Island
Lighting Co., 728 F.2d 52, 62-63 (2d Cir. 1984) (action by county on behalf of residents
against utility claiming breach of contract and warranty for misdesign of nuclear power plant
preempted by the AEA); Citizens for Orderly Energy Policy, Inc. v. County of Suffolk, 604 F.
Supp. 1084, 1094-96 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (county ordinance declaring impossibility of designing
an adequate evacuation plan for county residents not preempted by AEA).
138. See, e.g., Huber, Electricity and the Environment. In Search of Regulatory Authority,
100 HARV. L. REV. 1002, 1030-32 (1987) (criticizing Pacific Gas and Silkwood as leaving the
issue of AEA preemption in "considerable confusion").
139. It is extremely unlikely that this question ever will be litigated. States wishing to
impose a moratorium will be careful to document the economic justifications in committee
reports and the statutes themselves, regardless of the actual motivations of the legislators sup-
porting the bill.
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penalty payable to a private individual for violating state common-law
standards of nuclear safety is not preempted; however, a penalty payable
to the state for violating state statutory standards of nuclear safety is
preempted. 4° Nevertheless, the cases make at least one matter clear:
the original 1946 legislation exercised plenary control over nuclear tech-
nology. Any nonpreemption decision must find its rationale in subse-
quent legislation amending the AEA. 141 In Pacific Gas it was the 1954
Act and its 1959 amendments; in Silkwood it was the Price-Anderson
Act, added to the AEA in 1957 and amended in 1965.
B. Preemption of Regulation of Nuclear Weapons Production
The preceding discussion sheds only indirect light on the question
whether the AEA preempts ordinances prohibiting local governments
from contracting with producers of nuclear weapons, as distinguished
from producers of nuclear power, which were the subjects of regulation
in the cases discussed above. Although the AEA treats nuclear weapons
production and nuclear power production similarly in some respects, it
treats them quite differently in others. 142
As an initial matter, the AEA regulates nuclear weapons production
at least as comprehensively as nuclear power production. The licensing
requirements, for instance, apply whether the nuclear technology relates
to the development of power or weapons, 143 and domestic sales restric-
tions on nuclear material apply to material used in both weapons and
power production. 144 Further, although the AEA expressly promotes
140. See Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 256; Northern States, 447 F.2d at 1154.
141. See, eg., Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 251-56; Pacific Gas, 461 U.S. at 207-12.
142. The only case to consider AEA preemption in the context of nuclear weapons pro-
duction is McKay v. United States, 703 F.2d 464, 467-69 (10th Cir. 1983). In McKay, land-
owners near the Rocky Flats nuclear weapons production facility brought an action for
damage to their land for alleged radioactive seepage. At the time that McKay was decided, the
Supreme Court had decided Pacific Gas, and a different panel of the Tenth Circuit had issued
its opinion in Silkwood. Relying on its own opinion in Silkwood, the McKay court held that
the action was not preempted. Id at 469. As this part of the Article demonstrates, simple
application of the nuclear power cases in the weapons context is not a sufficient analytical
framework. Nonetheless, the result in McKay is correct in light of the subsequent Supreme
Court decision in Silkwood. The Price-Anderson Act applies to all nuclear occurrences.
Therefore, its tort law rationale should apply to both power and weapons producers. Because
new breed ordinances obviously do not fit within this "tort law" exception to preemption, as
discussed below, the analysis is necessarily different. One commentary reads McKay to stand
for the proposition that nuclear weapons and power producers must receive identical treat-
ment under the AEA. See Weaver, supra note 22, at 570-71. This view misreads McKay,
which can be rationalized under the tort law exception, and ignores the important distinctions
in the AEA between weapons and power production.
143. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2133, 2134 (1982).
144. Id § 2073.
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nuclear power, the Act invokes "common defense" or other military-re-
lated goals several times in reciting the general purpose of the Act.1 45
The Act's central distinction between nuclear power and weapons
production, however, is its radically different treatment of the end-prod-
uct of each. As the Court noted in Pacific Gas, the AEA allows states a
substantial voice in matters concerning electricity, the end-product of nu-
clear power plants. 146 Subchapter VIII of the AEA (which deals with
military applications), however, makes the federal government the sole
source of control with regard to nuclear weapons. 147 Section 2121(a) of
Title 42 gives the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (formerly the Atomic
Energy Commission) sole authority to do research and development
work 48 and to direct production of nuclear weapons, under the guidance
of the President. 49 Section 2122 expressly makes it unlawful for any
person to produce or possess a nuclear weapon. 50
The provisions in subchapter VIII were part of the original 1946
legislation, and the relevant legislative history confirms the intent to
maintain nuclear weapons production within the control of the federal
government.' 5' Senate Report 1211 of 1946 stressed the need for "an
absolute Government monopoly of production of fissionable materi-
als." 152 In support of the need for this monopoly, the report noted that
such "material is the principal ingredient of the atomic bomb" and that
"to permit private manufacture of fissionable material would be to permit
private manufacture of enormous destructive potentialities."'' 53 The re-
port noted the Commission's role as "the exclusive producer of atomic
weapons." 54 Finally, noting the President's role, the report stated that
"[i]n view of [their] enormous military significance, atomic weapons are
subject, under the bill, to full control by the President as Commander in
Chief. All determinations as to production rates, custody and transfers
are to be made by him."'155
145. See, e.g., id. §§ 2011(a), 2 012 (g), 2013(c), 2017(d).
146. Pacific Gas and Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n,
461 U.S. 190, 208-17 (1983).
147. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2121-2122 (1982).
148. Id. § 2121(a)(1); see id. § 2122.
149. Id. § 2121(a)(2); see id. § 2122.
150. Id. § 2122.
151. S. REP. No. 1211, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1946 U.S. CODE CONG. SERV.
1327, 1330.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 19, reprinted in 1946 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 1332.
155. Id.
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Subchapter VIII has remained largely unchanged. Thus, unlike the
conscious effort to relax the "absolute Government monopoly" with re-
gard to nuclear power production, the federal government has not re-
laxed its grip on nuclear weapons production. This is not surprising, as
concerns about private nuclear weapons production are even more justi-
fied today than in 1946. Further, whereas the states in Pacific Gas156 and
Silkwood 15 7 had a traditional area of authority to recapture, no such au-
thority exists with regard to nuclear weapons production, and there is no
specific statute returning a portion of the authority over nuclear weapons
production to the states. Therefore, the AEA completely occupies the
field of the regulation of nuclear weapons production.
Under the "displacement" theory of preemption,1 58 the AEA
preempts new breed nuclear free zone ordinances if they regulate nuclear
weapons production and therefore fall within the AEA-occupied field.
The issue of preemption becomes a question of whether the noncontract-
ing provisions constitute a regulation of nuclear weapons production.
Paradigmatic examples of "regulations" of conduct for purposes of AEA
preemption analysis include laws expressly forbidding such conduct
under threat of civil or criminal sanction159 or conditioning government
permission for conduct upon the fulfillment of specified prerequisites,
such as obtaining a permit. 160 For instance, the Minnesota law evaluated
in Northern States plainly constituted a regulation of the production of
nuclear power because the statute prohibited the operation of a nuclear
power plant unless the plant met specified safety standards. 16
Pacific Gas and Silkwood both suggest that "regulation" for pur-
poses of AEA preemption analysis extends beyond such core examples.
In Pacific Gas, the Court reasoned that regulation depends in part upon
legislative motive.1 62 In Silkwood, the court noted that an economic pen-
alty for specified conduct is regulation of that conduct for AEA preemp-
tion purposes. 163 These threads in the fabric of AEA preemption
doctrine suggest that an ordinance constitutes regulation of conduct for
purposes of the AEA if the law or ordinance is enacted for the purpose of
156. Pacific Gas and Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n,
461 U.S. 190, 208 (1983) (electric power).
157. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 238 (1984) (tort law).
158. See supra notes 100, 104-10 and accompanying text.
159. See, eg., Liesen v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 636 F.2d 94, 95 (5th Cir. 1981)
(civil injunction of nuclear power plant construction constitutes regulation of nuclear power
for purposes of ABA).
160. See, eg., Northern States, 447 F.2d at 1149.
161. See supra notes 85-94 and accompanying text.
162. See supra notes 108-14 and accompanying text.
163. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 256 (1984).
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influencing that conduct and achieves that influence with a penalty. 164
Thus, the noncontracting provisions of new breed ordinances plainly
constitute regulation of nuclear weapons production since the express
and obvious goal is to encourage producers to "abandon their work on
nuclear weapons."1 65 The ordinances influence nuclear weapons produc-
tion by imposing a penalty on any entity engaging in production. Con-
tracts with local governments provide an economic benefit to the
contracting parties; the deprivation of this economic benefit, which
would be available but for the entity's decision to engage in weapons
production, penalizes nuclear weapons production. Noncontracting pro-
visions of nuclear free zone ordinances thus constitute regulation of nu-
clear weapons production and are preempted by the AEA.166
III. Conflict with the Federal Military and
Foreign Affairs Powers
The supremacy clause, which is the source of the AEA's preemptive
effect, does not present the only constitutional obstacle to new breed or-
dinances; the ordinances also conflict with the federal government's role
164. Although these requirements of regulatory "purpose" and "effect" are plainly suffi-
cient to constitute regulation, it is doubtful that both requirements are necessary for regulation.
As the Supreme Court recently noted in dicta, even laws with incidental and indirect effects on
the conduct can constitute regulation of that conduct. See Goodyear Atomic Corp. v. Miller,
108 S. Ct. 1704, 1712 (1988). As the Court noted, Congress has the power to preempt such
indirect regulation if it chooses, although in Goodyear the majority concluded that Congress
had specifically endorsed the regulation. Id. In the nuclear power production field, Congress
specifically endorsed certain types of indirect regulation. Id. Congress, however, provided no
parallel endorsements in the nuclear weapons field. Therefore, even if the noncontracting pro-
visions constitute "indirect" regulation of nuclear weapons production, application of this ana-
lytical framework leads to the conclusion that the noncontracting provisions are preempted.
165. MARIN COUNTY, CAL., CODE, ch. 23.12, preamble (1988); Hayward, Cal., Ordi-
nance 87-024, § 3(f) (Sept. 15, 1987).
166. The prohibitions on contracting with nuclear weapons producers are, in all likeli-
hood, also in "actual conflict" with the AEA. This actual conflict branch of preemption has
two divisions: "physical impossibility" and "frustration of purpose." Pacific Gas, 461 U.S. at
204. There is plainly no impossibility of complying with both local and federal law; however,
the ordinances probably frustrate a federal purpose. As the 1946 legislation history made
clear, the primary goal was to maintain the federal government as the sole regulator of nuclear
weapons production. The ordinances clearly stand in the path of this goal and are, therefore,
preempted.
The frustration of purpose rubric has been criticized as "abstract." See Rothschild, supra
note 84, at 852-54. The continued vitality of this standard, however, is unquestionable in the
wake of Pacific Gas and Silkwood. A more appropriate criticism is that it is redundant of the
"displacement" theory. Displacement theory is a search for congressional intent; frustration
theory is a search for congressional purpose. The similarity of these quests probably explains
the extremely brief treatment given to the frustration theory in Pacific Gas and Silkwood. See
Pacific Gas, 461 U.S. at 220-22; Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 257.
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as the exclusive regulator of military and foreign affairs. Against the
backdrop of divisive state action brought about by the Articles of Con-
federation, Alexander Hamilton argued that the new Constitution would
promote "the common defense of the members; the preservation of pub-
lic peace, as well against internal convulsions as external acts; the regula-
tion of commerce with other nations and between the States; the
superintendence of our intercourse, political and commercial, with for-
eign countries."' 167 The Constitution achieved these goals by vesting in
the federal government the prescribed authorities, including the foreign
and military affairs powers. 168 Although the Constitution frames the
provisions concerning military and foreign affairs as affirmative grants of
power to the federal government, judicial interpretation has established
that the provisions have a "dormant" side that precludes some measure
of state action in both fields. 169 Although the exclusivity of federal au-
thority over military affairs and foreign affairs are distinct doctrines, each
one serves the same goal of ensuring that the United States can act as a
coherent unit in the international arena. The new breed ordinances inter-
fere with this ability and thus conflict with both of these doctrines.
A. Military Affairs
The United States Supreme Court outlined the zone of exclusive fed-
eral authority over military affairs more than a century ago. In Tarble's
Case, 170 the father of an enlisted soldier sought a writ of habeas corpus
from a Wisconsin state court commissioner. The father maintained that
a recruiting officer had the son in custody and had mustered the son into
the army before his eighteenth birthday. 171 The court commissioner is-
sued the writ, and the Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed. 172
The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that this issu-
ance of a writ was unconstitutional. 173 The Court noted that "the Na-
tional government" had the "plenary and exclusive" power to "'raise
and support armies' "and "to provide for the government and regulation
167. THE FEDERALIST No. 23, at 153 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). The twenty-
third paper is not the only one to deal with this subject. Several other papers discuss the
advantages of centralizing the government military and foreign relations functions. See, e.g.,
id. Nos. 24-29, 41-42.
168. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 11-16; id art. II, § 2.
169. See, eg., United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 230-31 (1941) (states may not interfere
with foreign relations); Tarble's Case, 80 U.S. 397, 408 (1871) (states may not interfere with
military affairs).
170. 80 U.S. 397, 398 (1871).
171. Id.
172. Id at 400.
173. Id at 411-12.
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of the land and naval forces." 174 The Court further reasoned that "[n]o
interference with the execution of this power of the National government
in the formation, organization, and government of its armies" could be
permitted "without greatly impairing [or] destroy[ing], this branch of
public service." 175 The Court noted that officers would be "subjected to
constant annoyance and embarrassment" if their decisions were con-
stantly scrutinized by the courts. 176 The chaos resulting from the scena-
rio of independent city, county, and state inquiries into the propriety of
military decisions conflicted with the constitutional mandate of a central-
ized military. 177
Tarble remains the authoritative Supreme Court pronouncement on
constitutional protection for military affairs,1 78 and its principle was ap-
plied recently in an instructive opinion of the Appellate Division of New
York. In Fossella v. Dinkins, 179 the court considered a proposed New
York City ordinance that effectively would have forbidden the city from
selling or leasing any property for use as a military base at which nuclear
weapons were to be sited.
The court, following Tarble, held the ordinance unconstitutional, 180
rejecting the argument that local concerns allow a local government to
prevent deployment of nuclear weapons within its borders.1 81 Such an
ordinance, the court reasoned, would drastically interfere with military
functions and violate the Tarble principle. 182 The court concluded that
if every local government were given the power to restrict the estab-
174. Id. at 408 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12, 14).
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. See id. at 408-09. Federal courts also have been extremely reluctant to allow federal
law intrusions into the realm of military affairs. Most notable in this respect is the Feres
doctrine, which precludes claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act for discretionary military
decisions. See Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950); Bynum v. FMC Corp., 770
F.2d 556, 574-77 (5th Cir. 1985) (federal common law does not allow servicemen to claim
product liability for design defect in military hardware if designed according to government
specifications).
178. Tarble is important for its teaching on the general authority of state courts to order
the release of federal prisoners. In fact, Justice Field framed the issued in Tarble two ways:
one in terms of state authority to control the military, the other in terms of general state
authority to order the release of federal prisoners. Tarble, 80 U.S. at 402. The importance of
this more general lesson of Tarble has been noted by other commentators. See, e.g., Redish &
Woods, Congressional Power to Control the Jurisdiction of Lower Federal Courts: A Critical
Review of a New Synthesis, 124 U. PA. L. REv. 45, 93 (1975). Nonetheless, Tarble is equally
important for its discussion of the exclusivity of federal power over military affairs.
179. 110 A.D.2d 227, 229, 494 N.Y.S.2d 878, 880 (1985).
180. Id. at 231, 494 N.Y.S.2d at 881.
181. Id. at 229-30, 494 N.Y.S.2d at 880.
182. Id.
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lishment and operation of Federal military installations or weaponry
located within its geographical jurisdiction, the power of the Federal
Government to raise and maintain an army or navy would, as warned
by the United States Supreme Court in Tarble's Case, be destroyed.18 3
The court also rejected the city's argument that the ordinance was pro-
tected noncooperation with the military, rather than unprotected ob-
struction.184 The court perceived no constitutionally significant
distinction between the two 185 and noted that, although a military instal-
lation might be able to operate independent of municipal services, such
operation would impair efficiency. Thus, the city exceeded its constitu-
tional authority in imposing this condition.'8 6
Two major lessons emerge from Tarble and Fossella. First, the rele-
vant effects on the military are those that result if the practice in question
is adopted universally. 187 Thus, the fact that only a relatively few juris-
dictions have adopted new breed ordinances is irrelevant to the constitu-
tional analysis because the issue is whether universal adoption would
impair the military. New breed ordinances attempt to place sufficient
economic pressure on producers to force them "to abandon their work
on nuclear weapons."188 The universal adoption of new breed ordi-
nances could thus affect the availability of weapons to the national mili-
tary. This would impair the efficient achievement of an express military
goal of the federal government.
Second, the effect on weapons availability need not cripple military
operations. Even if the new breed ordinances did impair the production
of nuclear weaponry, existing nuclear and conventional weaponry still
would exist. Under Tarble and Fossella, however, the effect on the mili-
tary need not be devastating, merely perceptible.18 9 Because the new
breed ordinances are an impediment to the efficient operation of a mili-
tary goal set by the federal government, they cannot survive constitu-
tional review.' 90
183. Id at 230, 494 N.Y.S.2d at 880 (citation omitted).
184. Id., 494 N.Y.S.2d at 880-881.
185. Id. at 230-231, 494 N.Y.S.2d at 881.
186. Id
187. See supra notes 177, 183 and accompanying text.
188. See, eg., MARIN COUNTY, CAL., CODE ch. 23-12, preamble (Nov. 4, 1986); Hay-
ward, Cal., Ordinance 87-024, § 3(f) (Sept. 15, 1987).
189. See Tarble, 80 U.S. at 408; Fossella, 110 A.D.2d at 231, 494 N.Y.S.2d at 881.
190. One commentary concludes that the Chicago nuclear free zone ordinance, which does
not include a noncontracting provision, does not interfere with the federal military relations
power. See Weaver, supra note 22, at 574-75. This commentary relied on the decision in Penn
Dairies v. Milk Control Comm'n, 318 U.S. 261, 281 (1943), to support this conclusion. The
purpose of this Article is to evaluate the legality of the noncontracting provisions common to
new breed ordinances, and because Chicago's ordinance does not contain such a provision, no
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B. Foreign Affairs
Just as for military affairs, the Constitution maintains a jealous hold
on foreign affairs for the federal government. In Zschernig v. Miller, 191
the United States Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of an
Oregon statute restricting the descent of property to foreign nationals.
The statute in question allowed payment to foreign heirs only if (1) the
foreign nation gave a reciprocal right to American citizens to take prop-
erty from foreign relatives, (2) the reciprocal payments were made in the
United States, and (3) the foreign heirs were able to receive the property
"without confiscation."' 192 The Oregon courts upheld the statute.193
In an opinion by Justice Douglas, the Supreme Court reversed and
held that the statute was an unconstitutional intrusion into the exclusive
authority of the federal government to regulate foreign affairs. 194 The
Court observed that the statute required a normative evaluation of the
legal system of the relevant foreign country. 195 According to the Court,
the requirement that the foreign country not impose confiscatory require-
ments on the foreign heir was an effort to judge the foreign country by
the American values encapsulated in the just compensation clause of the
fifth amendment. 196 The Court also criticized the Oregon courts for de-
ciding cases under the statute on the grounds of "foreign policy attitudes,
[such as] the freezing or thawing of the 'cold war' 1197 and held the
definite opinion on the validity of any of its provisions will be offered. Arguably, provisions
other than noncontracting provisions might run afoul of the dormant military relations pow-
ers. Unlike the noncontracting provisions, however, many other provisions are unlikely to
create a justiciable case or controversy. In any event, Penn Dairies sheds little light on the
question of whether the new breed ordinances can survive constitutional review. Penn Dairies
considered whether a Pennsylvania law regulating milk prices could apply to a contract be-
tween a private milk producer and the federal government to supply milk to a military base.
Id. at 266. The Supreme Court concluded that the state law could be enforced, relying on the
fact that the law applied to all purchasers, including the federal government, and thus was one
of "the normal incidents of the operation within the same territory of a dual system of govern-
ment .. " Id. at 271. Penn Dairies did not discuss Tarble, and it purported only to deal with
states' ability to regulate affairs of the federal government generally. Because new breed ordi-
nances affect an activity carried out solely to serve federal military goals, such ordinances
cannot come within the "normal incidents" rationale of Penn Dairies. Therefore, cases such as
Tarble and Fossella, which deal with efforts to affect military policy, speak more directly to the
issue.
191. 389 U.S. 429, 430-431 (1968).
192. Id.
193. Id. at 431.
194. Id. at 441.
195. Id. at 440.
196. Id. at 435.
197. Id. at 437.
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statute unconstitutional because it "affected international relations in a
persistent and subtle way." 198
The Zschernig Court expressly declined to overrule Clark v. Al-
len 199-also authored by Justice Douglas-in which the Court refused to
strike down a California statute conditioning the inheritance by foreign
nationals upon the availability of a reciprocal right to United States citi-
zens.20° Zschernig distinguished Clark in two ways. First, Clark in-
volved a simple reciprocity provision, not the requirement of a
nonconfiscatory legal system.201 According to the Court, this simpler
and less judgmental statutory scheme did not invite the same criticism of
foreign systems as the Oregon statute at issue in, Zschernig.202 Second,
the Zschernig statute was accompanied by a long history of interpreta-
tion that the Court found offensive, while the Court had considered the
Clark statute only on its face.20 3
Justice Harlan, concurring in the result, argued that the Zschernig
majority opinion was irreconcilable with Clark.2°4 A fairer reading of
the two decisions, however, reveals a narrow, but navigable, channel. 20 5
Whether a statute or ordinance intrudes on the foreign affairs power is a
matter of degree. If the statute evinces or entails necessary criticism of
the policies of foreign nations, it oversteps the bounds of permissible state
authority. If, however, it simply requires a nonjudgmental construction
of foreign standards, it is permissible. 20 6
These principles have been most recently applied in two areas. The
first is the so-called "Buy-American" statutes. In R.S.B. Technical Sides
Corp. v. North Jersey District Water Supply Commission of the State of
New Jersey,20 7 the New Jersey Supreme Court concluded that the New
Jersey Buy-American statute was constitutional because a requirement
that the state purchase American goods, when available, did not entail
198. Id. at 440.
199. Id. at 432; Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503 (1947).
200. Clark, 331 U.S. at 517-18.
201. Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 432-33.
202. Id. at 434.
203. Id. at 432-33.
204. Iad at 445 (Harlan, J., concurring).
205. See Lewis, Dealing with South Africa: The Constitutionality of State and Local Divest-
ment Legislation, 61 TUL. L. REv. 469, 513-14 (1987) (discussing lower court decisions in the
wake of Zschernig and Clark).
206. See id. at 513-15; see also In re Estate of Kish, 52 N.J. 454, 466, 246 A.2d 1, 8 (1968)
(striking down New Jersey foreign inheritance statute); In re Estate of Leikind, 22 N.Y.2d 346,
352, 239 N.E.2d 550, 553, 292 N.Y.S.2d 681, 685-86 (1968) (upholding New York foreign
inheritance statute); First Nat'l Bank v. Fishman, 16 Ohio Misc. 185, 195-96 (1968) (invalidat-
ing Ohio foreign inheritance statute).
207. 75 N.J. 272, 291-92, 381 A.2d 774, 783-84 (1977)
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any criticism of foreign governments.208 In Bethlehem Steel Corp. v.
Board of Commissioners,209 however, a California court of appeals struck
down a similar statute on the grounds that it offered "great potential for
disruption" with established trade policies of the federal government and
thus exceeded state authority. Commentators, like the two courts above,
also disagree on the constitutionality of these statutes.210
The foreign affairs power also is prominent in the context of South
African divestment laws, which require local and state governments to
sell their investments in companies doing business in South Africa.211
The reported decisions suggest that these ordinances and statutes are in-
herently critical of South African policies and thus beyond state author-
ity under the doctrine announced in Zschernig.212 At least one
commentator, however, has argued that divestment laws are constitu-
tional, pointing to justifications unrelated to foreign relations.213 Other
commentators argue that these factors cannot overcome the criticism of
South Africa inherent in the divestment laws.21 4
Whether new breed ordinances encroach upon the foreign affairs
power, however, does not depend directly on the outcome of the debate
over the constitutionality of either the Buy-American or South African
divestment laws. The rationale underlying the foreign affairs doctrine is
that the federal government must have the ability to conduct itself in a
208. Id. See generally Kenworthy, The Constitutionality of State Buy-American Laws, 50
UMKC L. REV. 1, 20 (1981) (statutes are constitutional); Note, State Buy American Laws-
Invalidity of State Attempts to Favor American Producers, 64 MINN. L. REV. 389, 412 (1980)
(statutes are unconstitutional); Note, California's Buy-American Policy: Conflict with GATT
and the Constitution, 17 STAN. L. REV. 119, 132 (1964) (authored by H. Usher) (same); Note,
Constitutionality of Buy American Acts Under the Commerce and Supremacy Clauses, 8 VA. J.
INT'L L. 151, 155-56 (1967) (authored by D. Zachary) (same); Comment, In-State Preferences
in Public Contracting: States' Rights Versus Economic Sectionalism, 49 U. COLO. L. REV. 205,
227 (1978) (authored by D. Jordan) (same).
209. 276 Cal. App. 2d 221, 228-29, 80 Cal. Rptr. 800, 805 (1968) (quoting Zschernig, 389
U.S. at 434-435).
210. See supra note 205.
211. See Lewis, supra note 205, at 471-75.
212. See, e.g., Springfield Rare Coin Galleries, Inc. v. Johnson, 115 Ill. 2d 221, 231-38, 503
N.E.2d 300, 304-08 (1986) (state statute singling out South Africa for unfavorable treatment
unconstitutional); New York Times Co. v. City of N.Y. Comm'n on Human Rights, 41
N.Y.2d 345, 349-53, 361 N.E.2d 963, 966-69 (1977) (state commission ruling that newspaper
violated state statute by publishing advertisements of employment opportunities in South Af-
rica beyond state authority). But see The New Abolitionist, Oct. 1987, at 3, col. 1 (discussing
Maryland trial court ruling upholding Baltimore's divestment ordinance) (on file at The Has-
tings Law Journal).
213. See Lewis, supra note 205.
214. See, e.g., Note, State and Local Anti-South Africa Action as on Intrusion upon the
Federal Power in Foreign Affairs, 72 VA. L. REv. 813 (1986) (authored by Peter J. Spiro).
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unified manner in the international arena.215 Both the Buy-American
laws and the divestment laws are more removed from this concern than
the new breed ordinances. If the Buy-American laws are unconstitu-
tional on foreign relations grounds, it is because of their oblique criticism
of foreign trading practices. This may raise the specter of a federal gov-
ernment less critical of foreign governments than its constituent parts. If
the divestment laws are unconstitutional, it is because they imply criti-
cism of South Africa that is more fierce than that directed by the federal
government.216 The possibility that either of these laws will undercut
United States foreign policy seemingly depends upon how foreign coun-
tries view them.
New breed ordinances, however, attempt to undo a link that has
been established, for better or worse, in American foreign policy: a com-
mitment to an effective nuclear arsenal. This practical effort to counter-
act a national foreign policy goal directly affects the ability to adhere to a
unified policy; divestment and Buy-American laws present, at most, an
indirect threat. New breed ordinances go beyond the bounds of state and
local authority to act in the area of foreign relations and thus are
unconstitutional.
Conclusion
The noncontracting provisions of new breed nuclear free zone ordi-
nances are unenforceable for several reasons. In some states, they con-
ffict with statutes requiring local governments to contract with the lowest
responsible bidder. Lowest responsible bidder statutes require local gov-
ernments to contract with the most inexpensive contractor able to per-
form, not necessarily the most inexpensive contractor that conforms to
social value judgments aligned with the local governments. Further, the
provisions are preempted by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. The AEA
occupies the field of nuclear weapons production, and new breed ordi-
nances fall within that occupied field because they regulate nuclear weap-
ons production. Finally, these provisions exceed the authority of local
and state governments to regulate military and foreign affairs. The con-
215. See, eg., Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 285 (1976); Hines v. Davido-
witz, 312 U.S. 52, 62-63 (1941); Springfield, 115 Ill. 2d at 226, 503 N.E.2d at 305 (United
States must speak with "one voice" in its dealings with foreign nations); see also, Note, supra
note 214, at 842-846.
216. At least nominally, the federal government is opposed to South African internal poli-
cies. See, eg., Exec. Order No. 12,532, 3 C.F.R. 387 (1985), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 1701 at
661-63 (Supp. 111 1985); Lyman, U.S. Export Policy Toward South Africa, Dep't St. Bull.,
May 1983, at 25; Reagan, Rededication to the Cause of Human Rights, reprinted in U.S. Dep't
of State, Current Policy No. 643, at 2 (Dec. 10, 1984) (condemning apartheid).
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stitutional grants of power to the federal government also carry with
them implicit limitations on state and local authority to act in this area.
Thus, the new breed ordinances are invalid and should be struck down
by the courts or the legislature.
